India’s Nuclear Sell-Out?

Foreign Policy: Jacob Leibenluft

Both critics and supporters thought India got the better end of last week’s U.S.-India deal on nuclear technology. Yet, in India, many feel that New Delhi gave up too much for too little.


Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to Washington seemed about as good as it gets. He arrived to an elaborate state welcome on the White House South Lawn and was feted at only the fifth grand banquet of the George W. Bush presidency. Addressing a joint session of congress, he was interrupted more than two dozen times by applause from U.S. lawmakers. The biggest triumph appeared to come at the bargaining table, where Singh and Bush agreed to a deal that effectively ended nuclear export restrictions placed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. In the United States, the deal has been portrayed as such a boon for India that critics such as Democratic Rep. Ed Markey have denounced the Bush administration for “playing favorites.”

But for all the talk of a resounding diplomatic victory, Singh received less than a hero’s welcome when he returned home. As part of the deal, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and bring the civilian ones under international safeguards. Now, from both the left and the right, the prime minister is facing difficult questions as to whether he gave up too much for too little.

In Washington, India is seen as a big winner in two ways—by shedding its identity as a nuclear pariah state and by taking an important step toward addressing its growing energy needs. But for Singh’s critics, those victories appear rather hollow. In the Deccan Chronicle, one of south India’s leading daily newspapers, a cartoonist lampooned the deal by depicting Singh being wrapped in a sash that read “IAEA,” with a nearby advisor telling him, “Congrats, sir—it means we’ve been given a nuclear power status!” In return for concessions, these critics argue, all India received was acknowledgement of what everyone already knew. Many also emphasize what India didn’t get: U.S. support for a permanent seat on the U.N. Secretary Council or formal recognition as a “legitimate nuclear power.”

Several prominent Indian nuclear scientists and defense analysts argue that the separation of India’s military and civilian nuclear facilities will be difficult and perhaps even prohibitively expensive. “These have been integrated from the very beginning.... To now try to sort out the integrated whole into these constituent parts is just about impossible,” says Bharat Karnad, a military analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies in New Delhi. “People like me, and in the Indian nuclear establishment, are completely mystified as to what we can gain from this collaboration and cooperation with the United States.”


Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his fellow members of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) argue that the separation of civilian and military facilities will limit the amount of fissile material India can possess and weaponize—leading to a de facto cap on its nuclear arsenal. And the Communist Party, a key ally of the Congress Party-led government, has been no less critical of the deal, claiming that it has compromised India’s independent nuclear policy and that it marked an unwelcome “pro-U.S. shift” in Indian foreign policy.

Those criticisms have been amplified by mistrust that lingers from nearly 60 years of strained relations between the world’s largest democracies. Only three weeks before Singh arrived in Washington, declassified documents were released showing U.S. President Richard Nixon calling Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi an “old witch” and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger remarking that “the Indians are bastards anyway.” It was front-page news in India, even if it barely earned a mention stateside. Despite polls suggesting that Indians are among the most pro-American people in the world, disappointment with Washington’s post-9/11 coziness with Pakistan and mixed feelings about the Bush administration’s policies in the Middle East have kept old suspicions alive.

Even supporters of the deal’s substance remain anxious about Washington’s ability to hold up the American end of the bargain. Bush must get congress’s approval and will face opponents on both sides of the aisle. And even if Capitol Hill signs on, the Bush administration must convince other nuclear supplier countries to reopen nuclear commerce with India. For supporters and opponents of the deal alike, the attitude is “wait and watch,” says Harinder Sekhon of the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi think tank.

The big question for Singh is how much of the criticism he faces is serious, and how much simply reflects the rough-and-tumble of Indian politics. When the BJP held the reigns from 1998 to 2004, it brought India closer to the United States. But recently, it has grasped at every opportunity to criticize Singh’s Congress-led government. “[The BJP] is trying to make some noises in order to establish its position as an opposition party,” says Pankaj Vohra, political editor of the Hindustan Times. But those noises, joined by outcries on the left, may ensure a steady downpour of debate as the Parliament’s monsoon session begins this week. Back in New Delhi, Manmohan Singh may soon feel nostalgic for Washington hospitality.



Jacob Leibenluft, currently in India, is editor in chief of the Yale Daily News.