note on the Indian handling of its southern front

Tamil Canadian Services: Tamil Eelam - Maravanpulavu K. Sachithananthan: "When the Sinhalese youth revolted against the government in Colombo in April 1971, India rushed a small contingent of armed men in support of the Colombo government to quell the insurgency. But that bonhomie was not to last long.

Few months later, during the liberation of Bangladesh, Colombo provided landing facilities to Pakistani military aircraft in their long haul from Karachi to Dakka circling the subcontinent. This was resented by India, which had the US seventh fleet at its doorstep. A disloyal neighbour at its southern front in spite of India's policy of appeasement! During the early seventies, the magnitude of the discriminatory measures by the Sri Lankan government provoked the Eelam Tamil youth to develop armed resistance.

This was spontaneous and unorganised during its early phase. Many of the resisters hailing from Valvettithurai, (a town famous for disregarding the Sri Lankan post independent customs regulations) were familiar with the Tamil Nadu coastline. These youth used to cross over for safety to Tamil Nadu after 'retaliatory operations'. It happened during the mid seventies, that Mr. Karunanidhi as Chief Minister agreed to the deportation of a youth suspected of having master minded 'retaliatory operations' in Sri Lanka. Mr. Kuttimani was brought to Sri Lanka and was under custody for some time. Tamil Nadu was not helping the Sri Lankan government but was obliging a request (once again to appease Colombo) from New Delhi for extradition. There were mild protests in Tamil Nadu when Kuttimani was deported. Colombo insisted and India agreed (once again to appease Colombo) to a maritime delimitation in the Palk Straits and Gulf of Mannar (1974 and 1976). Colombo got the island of Kachativu and a virtual control over the seas of Palk Straits and Gulf of Mannar. Sri Lankan navy was granted the 'official' licence by India to shoot and kill anybody it pleased anywhere in these waters in addition of extortion of money, fish-catch and fishing gear from the traditional users of these waters. These waters became the water-grave for a large number of persons, all of them Tamils (traders, migrants, militants, refugees and fishermen).

More than one thousand Tamil Nadu fishermen have lost their lives and many thousands have been maimed and India stops at asking its High Commission in Colombo to facilitate the return of arrested fishermen. The usual series of diplomatic expressions - 'concerns', 'protests', or 'warnings' - were never used by New Delhi in checking these trigger happy naval boats from Colombo. One incident worth mentioning is the recent (1999) incursion by the Sri Lankan navy into Indian waters to reach the village Ollaiyadi in the island of Rameswaram and destroy the hutment there (a feeler for future incursions) and return with impunity!

During the early seventies Mr. Rajaratnam from Eelam came to Tamil Nadu to lobby for the cause of the Eelam Tamils. A youth leader, Mr. R. Janardhanan hired a house in Egmore, (courtesy, a Muslim philanthropist) to run an organisation whose basic object was to lobby for the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka. Mr. Rajaratnam was behind these activities. Periodical briefings to political leaders, conducting small meetings and publishing leaflets were the main activities of this organisation. Mr. S. J. V. Chelvanayakam visited Chennai along with his lieutenants and met all the first and second line leaders of all political parties in Chennai. Mr. & Mrs. Amirthalingam amplified his feeble utterances during discussions. Mr. Rajaratnam and Mr. Janardhanan arranged for these meetings. Mr. Karunanidhi was then Chief Minister. In early 1977 when Mr. Chelvanayakam was ill Mr. Karunanidhi as Chief Minister sent a neurosurgeon and later when Mr. Chelvanayakam passed away, second line leaders from DMK and ADMK visited Jaffna to pay homage. This was reflective of the efforts of Mr. Rajaratnam during his mission in Chennai. Thus began the active interest Tamil Nadu took to the sufferings the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The 1977 manifestation of the violent pogrom drew huge protests in Tamil Nadu. Some of us (including Mr Kovai Mahesan and myself) telephoned the DMK leaders from Colombo and urged them to do anything that will protect us from the hooligans. The state of Tamil Nadu observed a 12-hour hartal in July 1977, for the first time in support of the Eelam Tamils, answering a call of Mr. M. Karunanidhi, who was then the leader of the opposition in the assembly.

The Tamil United Liberation Front and the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu had by then established an emotional relationship which had sincerity of purpose, dedication to values and most of all a deep involvement to uplift the Tamils in Eelam and in the plantation sector of Sri Lanka.

They could have easily chartered out a political course with connotations of a greater Tamilakam but that was not anywhere in the agenda. TULF wanted the restoration of Tamil rights in Sri Lanka towards sharing power in Colombo or having it on their own. Similarly Dravidian parties were not only forging electoral alliances with national parties in India but also enjoying the fruits of such associations by sharing power in Delhi.

In 1979 I attended a seminar in Gujarat representing one of the front organisations of the TULF. Followers of the Jayaprakash Narayan movement were at the seminar. An informal request seeking India's intervention in taming Sinhala chauvinism were made by me to Mr. Narayan Desai and Mr.Radhakrishnan (both of them from Gandhi Peace Foundation). This was conveyed by them later to the then Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai.

During his visit to Colombo during early 1979, Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai publicly offered to facilitate a settlement of the ethnic conflict. TULF leaders led by Professor K. Nesiah had few rounds of discussions with Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai at Colombo. This was the first offer by any Prime Minister of India to facilitate a settlement. That was the beginning. Thereafter India began providing a firm support base to the Tamils.

The Tamil militancy became more organised and forceful. Government of Sri Lanka continued its oppressive measures.

Tamil militancy gave Colombo the necessary excuse to enlarge its security establishment. Numerous army camps spotted the Tamil homeland. Many locations in the Tamil homeland were identified for Sinhala colonisation. Ex-convicts and goondas were settled in these colonies. During this period (1977-1983) Tamil militants crossed the Palk Straits many times to establish pockets of support bases in several parts of Tamil Nadu which after 1983 became their centres of training. Also during this period Tamil militants organised themselves into groups. Their group names included two key words - Liberation and Eelam.

These and other related events were ferments for the next mega pogrom of 1983. Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister sent Mr. Narasimmha Rao to Colombo during the rioting days of August 1983. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Mr. M. G. Ramachandran spoke on the All India Radio emphasising the support Tamil Nadu will provide for the Eelam Tamils. President Jayawardane was working on an undeclared war and Mr Rao's visit could not stop it.

The spontaneous emotional upheaval in Tamil Nadu to the 1983 events in Sri Lanka received recognition all over India. Dravidian and National parties vied with each other to support the Tamil Eelam liberation groups. Indian media gave adequate coverage. Mrs. Gandhi ignoring protocol, invited Mr. Amirthalingam for talks. The protection of Tamils in Sri Lanka was India's duty President Giani Jail Singh said. India's de facto recognition of the Tamil militant groups was another step in that direction. India provided them arms and training. The people of Tamil Nadu enthusiastically supported the Tamil militants. They were like cheering supporters at sports events. They gave financial, logistical and moral support to the militants and stopped at that. In similar situations in Africa, Latin America and the Far East some of such supporters transformed themselves into recruits either as volunteers or as mercenaries. To the credit of Tamils on both sides of the Palk Straits this transformation did not take place at all.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi identified the Colombo Government as lackey of US interests in the region. Verification is necessary about a statement attributed to her calling Mr Jayawardane as a 'political old fox.' India was trying to understand the real nature of the Sinhalese polity. But Colombo has been known for outmanoeuvring India. When Mr. Rao's mission failed, Mr. Parthasarathy took over as India's chief negotiator. He had an open mandate from Mrs. Gandhi to tame Colombo. But Mr. Jayawardane did not oblige. He led India into a maze of political lanes and by-lanes and bought time.

Passing away of Mrs. Gandhi and the arrival of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi made a relaxing change for Colombo. Mrs. Gandhi was the most feared of all Indian Prime Ministers in Colombo. She was not there. For Mr Jayawardane the wind was taken off the sail and as he indicated in Bangalore, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was a political novice. Mr. Bhandari took over from Mr Parthasarathy. The Thimpu talks were a set back to India. Mr. Dixit was appointed. One incident - when Mr. Dixit had to wait at Prime Minister Premadasa's door for a few hours before being called in - provided the hint for India bashing.

Colombo cleverly manipulated India to send its forces to contain Tamil militancy. The 1987 agreement between India and Sri Lanka provided for an inkling of a political institution (for the Tamil homeland), which never took shape.

The signing of the agreement was a clear infringement of the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese nationalists were fully aware of this. Their token protest was through a naval rating that hit Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in his back inside the Presidential Palace of Colombo. This was not the first time Sinhalese were hitting Indian leaders. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's grand father Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, while addressing a meeting at Galle Face Green in July 26, 1939 was hooted and humiliated by thugs organised by the Sinhala Maha Saba's Mr. A. E. Gunasinghe to protest at India's intervention in the formation of Ceylon Indian Congress. The naval rating who hit Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 was a follower of Prime Minister Premadasa (in turn a disciple of Mr. A. E. Gunasinghe).

Using the agreement, India was gearing to translate the emotions of its Tamil Nadu citizens to save the Eelam and plantation Tamils. However, Colombo merticulouly perfected the transformation of these Indian objectives to turn the Indian forces fight the very same people (Tamils) they came to save! That is why Mr. M. Karunanithi as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu reflecting the mood of all Tamils did not go to receive the returning IPKF at Chennai harbour.

Two major events after 1987 put India's support to Eelam Tamils in hibernation. First was the Tamil support for the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The second was the murder of Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu. Two minor factors were the

(1) Spill over violence in Tamil Nadu that received undue media attention in India, and (2) Murders of moderate Tamils and fellow militants.

During 1991-95 India was gasping for a way to wriggle out of the embroilment of the 1983-1989 past. There were mistakes made by all sides in handling the situation. India did not want the situation to get out of its hand and allow the western countries to poke in. At the same time both warring parties were reluctant to consult India.

The conquest of Jaffna in November 1995 brought the Eelam Tamil issue back into focus in Tamil Nadu. Mr. Karunanidhi led DMK, organised a black shirt procession to test the reaction of the people. Later he called for a 12-hour hartal on 30th November 1995, which was supported by all political parties in Tamil Nadu including the ruling AIADMK. This marked the beginning of the revival of the support base for Eelam Tamils in Tamil Nadu.

However, past experiences prevented the translation of this support into any form of action. The establishment in Delhi, as Colombo's Foreign Minister Kadirgamar once said,

"the Brahmins of the South Block" both in the defence and external affairs call the shots. Because they understood the dubious attitude of Colombo, they are not prepared take chances and for another bout of disappointment from their southern front. Also the Tamil militants have nearly reached a point of no return from their position of liberating Tamil Eelam. That is why south block is hesitant to chalk out another diplomatic offensive to give effect to the emotional and political content of the growing protests in Tamil Nadu. Mr. Gujral as Foreign Minister and later as Prime Minister after 1995 drew a policy charter for India's neighbours, which was later called the Gujral doctrine. This policy envisaged among others, the

(1)Non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states

(2) Non-availability of Indian soil for dissenters and revolters from neighbouring states, and (3) Dismantling of any image India had as big brother in the region.

This was a big boon to Colombo. Even after BJP led coalition took over in 1996, Mr. Gujral had his say in Foreign policy whom the south block frequently consulted.

The continuing movement of most people across the borders of India's neighbours does not enjoy any legitimacy in any country in the region. If they are innocent people, these countries may close their eyes and allow them to move across the British introduced demarcations violating British introduced travel procedures. But among these migrants are

(1) Armed persons

(2) Political asylum seekers

(3) Economic offenders

(4) Missionaries, and

(5) Persons intentionally seeking to change the demography of regions in the subcontinent.

Also India is hosting a Government in Exile for a neighbouring liberation movement. In this context, as I said earlier, the southern front is an insignificant front for India. This by default is to the advantage of the Sinhala chauvinism and its continued violent manifestations. "

Maravanpulavu K. Sachithananthan, Formerly with the University of Jaffna, And UN/FAO.